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Post on Apr views. General 23 November Original: EnglishSecurity CouncilLetter 243s20009 23 November from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the 243s209 CouncilOn behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolutionI have the honour to submit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In this connection, I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and FDLR solh removal from many of its bases are only a partial success, considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters.
The report shows that FDLR continues to benefit from aoln but significant support from top commanders of the Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo FARDCparticularly officers in the 10th military region South Kivuand has sealed strategic alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu.
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The Group has also documented that FDLR has a far-reaching international diaspora network involved in the day-to-day running of the movement, the coordination of military and arms trafficking activities and the management of financial activities. This report presents two case studies on the involvement of individuals linked to faith-based organizations. The Group investigated FDLRs ongoing exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves, which the Group calculates continues to deliver millions of dollars in direct financing into the FDLR coffers.
The present report illustrates how FDLR gold networks are tightly intertwined with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as in the United Arab Emirates. In this context, the officer class of the Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple CNDPin particular General Bosco Ntaganda, has continued to retain heavy weapons acquired during its period of rebellion in spite of its official integration into FARDC and still controls revenue-generating activities and parallel local administrations.
The Group also presents documentary evidence showing that General Ntaganda continues to act as the deputy operational commander of Kimia II. The Group has monitored compliance with paragraph 5 of resolutionby which the Security Council decided that all States are to notify the sanctions committee in advance regarding the shipment of arms and related material for the Democratic Republic of the Congo or any provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities, especially given the Groups findings on the continued diversion of FARDC military equipment to non-governmental armed groups, notably FDLR.
The present report also documents the failure of a number of States to notify the sanctions committee of training they provided to FARDC.
The Group also reports on violations of human rights committed in contravention of subparagraphs 4 de and f of resolution and concludes that FARDC and non-governmental armed groups continue to perpetrate human rights abuses, in the context of Kimia II operations in contravention of international humanitarian law.
FARDC and FDLR have been involved in significant killings of civilians and other abuses from March to Octobercausing additional waves of displacement of several hundred thousand civilians. The findings of the report underline the need for solh urgent establishment of a vetting mechanism and the strengthening of accountability and the justice system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
A list of FARDC commanders currently deployed in the Kimia II operation with an established record of human rights abuses is annexed to the present report annex The Federal Police of Germany arrested Mr.
Ignace Murwanashyaka and Mr. Straton Musoni, the president and vice-president of FDLR respectively, on 17 Novemberfollowing the submission 24s32009 the present report on 9 November by woln Group of Experts to the 033 of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution Musoni were arrested on suspicion of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as on the 243ss2009 of other charges related to the forming and membership of a foreign terrorist organization.
The Group of Experts commenced its work on 2 March in New York, where it held consultations with United Nations officials and diplomatic missions before travelling to Europe to meet with representatives of various Governments and non-governmental organizations. The Group subsequently deployed to Kinshasa on 20 March to begin five weeks of 23s2009 work in the region, following which it presented its interim findings to the Sanctions Committee on 9 May The Group continued 2432009 consult with central and provincial government authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but regrets not being afforded an opportunity to hold substantive consultations with that countrys Ministry of Defence.
The 243s2090 visited the United Arab Emirates where it held meetings with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dubai authorities and private sector entities. In accordance with paragraph 10 of resolutionthe Group continued to adopt a case study approach, focusing on North and South Kivu and Ituri.
The Group also undertook missions to Bunia and to Ituri district. In particular, the Group continued to focus its research on the activities of the Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi FDLR-FOCAas well as the activities of the movements political leadership and diaspora members residing outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Group continued its analysis of the integration process of non-governmental armed groups in Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo FARDCas well as on non-integrated elements that remain outside the current peace process. In the light of the political and military developments observed duringthe Group also centred its research on potential security threats in connection with weak integration of non-State armed groups into FARDC, aggravated by the conduct of military operations in the Kivus Umoja Wetu and Kimia II.
With respect to paragraph 5 of resolutionthe Group continued to investigate arms shipments to the Democratic Republic of the Congo that were not notified by exporting countries to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution The Group continued its research into the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups. The Group also monitored, to the extent possible, the implementation by Member States of the targeted travel and financial measures imposed against individuals and entities on the Committees list.
The Group consulted broadly and met with a number of different interlocutors during its fieldwork, including the civilian and military authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other States in the region, national civil aviation authorities, mineral traders, representatives of business entities, air and land transport companies and non-governmental organizations, as well as former and current militia members, and representatives of the local and international press.
A list of meetings and consultations held by the Group is contained in the annex to the present report annex 1. When this was not possible, the Group corroborated information using at least three independent and reliable sources.
In general, the Group chose not to provide detailed profiles of its sources, in order to guarantee their anonymity and to protect them from possible retaliation. The Group obtained more than telephone logs, which it analysed to the extent possible. The Group wishes to state that it did not monitor telecommunications referred to throughout the present report, but only analysed the timing and length of telephone calls made.
Analysis of telephone logs helped the Group to determine trends or particular patterns of communication and to further corroborate information obtained from documents, testimonies and interviews. Political and military context Due to the speed at which the integration process took place in North Kivu, many weapons stockpiles remained personalized and hidden away in secret caches, and children who 243e2009 been previously recruited into the armed movements were integrated into the new FARDC structures.
In South Kivu roughly elements from Mai Mai Asani, the Yakutumba group and the Forces rpublicaines fdralistes FRF 243w2009 three groups based in the high plateau accepted to join the integration process in Augustalthough it is not fully clear whether these troops are responding wholly under the chain of command of FARDC.
Operation Umoja Wetu The Group established on the basis of its field work and of reports received from FARDC and MONUC, that while such operations initially pushed FDLR away from military bases in North Kivu and several other strategic positions, FDLR subsequently managed to re-occupy some of the positions they had lost and conducted frequent reprisal campaigns against civilian villages, which 2432s009 acts of killing, raping, looting and burning.
These retaliations were also marked by the displacement of thousands of people. While the Group could not document this misappropriation of funds, it received consistent reports both so,n presidential 24s2009 in Kinshasa and from FARDC officials involved in the operations.
During Umoja Wetu the Group also received consistent reports that RDF and newly integrated CNDP elements working in tandem had cleared several areas of civilian populations, particularly in Walikale territory, where newly integrated former Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple CNDP troops planted the seeds of their present control over principle axes in mining-rich 0 of the territory. According to humanitarian and human rights workers operating in affected areas, the human cost of the operations has been high due to the abuses perpetrated against civilian populations by FARDC troops deployed in the operation theatre, FDLR and RUD-Urunana reprisal attacks, and attacks by Mai Mai groups.
Scores of villages have been raided and pillaged, thousands of houses have been burnt and several hundred thousand people have been displaced in order to escape from violence generated by military operations. The operations have also been a vector through which former CNDP officers have cemented their control over mineral-rich areas, notably the Hauts Plateaux area in Kalehe, mining areas in Walikale and areas around the KahuziBiega National Park in Shabunda territory. Former CNDP units have also forcibly displaced large numbers of civilians from land in the Mushake zone of Masisi in order to find grazing areas for cattle being brought in from Rwanda.
During the period of Kimia II operations, several thousand refugees based in camps in Rwanda trickled back to reoccupy contested land in the Kivus, exacerbating ethnic and landbased tensions among local communities. According to human rights and humanitarian workers who have visited the area, FARDC have carried out numerous attacks deliberately targeting and killing hundreds of civilians there.
While FDLR have been dispersed from many of their original bases, they have regrouped in significant numbers around four areas: With their local supply and logistics chain disrupted, FDLR have attempted to adapt by launching smaller attacks on vulnerable civilian populations in order to pillage and take hostages for ransom.
It therefore remains difficult to assess whether the 243z2009 force of the FDLR has diminished significantly from the 6, to 8, fighters the Group of Experts estimated the FDLR had in Military operations have thus not succeeded in neutralizing FDLR, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the Kivus, and have resulted in an expansion of CNDPs military influence in the region.
Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi The Group continued its research into FDLRs illegal exploitation of natural resources in complicity with traders working for Congolese mineral-exporting companies.
Internal military support networksCollaboration between the Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo and the Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda Tenth military region Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo The cases documented by the Group do not give a full picture of 243w2009 current extent of FARDC material support to non-State armed groups. Nevertheless, the Group is of the view that the Kinshasa authorities are aware of some of these leaks and have taken no appropriate measures, undermining FARDCs control over its own internal stockpiles and military operations against FDLR.
The Group documented the attempted diversion of military equipment from the tenth military region in Decemberand corroborated several other cases of diversion that took place inthrough the recovery of hidden arms caches in collaboration with MONUC and through various testimonies gathered in the course of its work in South Kivu, including from military justice officials.
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The Group has obtained a report from a security agency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo annex 4 and a case file from the intelligence officers T2 of the tenth military region annex 5which describes the attempted diversion on 13 December of 14, rounds of 7. These documents have been archived at the United Nations. The Group separately interviewed two FARDC officers of the tenth military region who were aware of the diversion of this military equipment.
The officers also informed the Group that there had been other similar episodes over the past year orchestrated by internal FARDC networks loyal to Colonel Baudouin Nakabaka, the deputy commander of the tenth military region in charge of logistics and administration, and his direct superior General Pacifique Masunzu. The tenth military region is responsible for managing the arms stockpile and the salary payments of FARDC soldiers operating in South Kivu.
Commanders of the tenth military region are not involved in the chain of command of Kimia II. The case file obtained by the Group shows Colonel Nakabakas direct complicity in the attempted diversion of ammunition on 13 December The documents show that Colonel Nakabakas telephone number was found on the drivers telephone.
According to the T2 case file, FARDC witnesses confirmed that the munitions were supposed to be delivered to Yves Mukulikire, a resident of Uvira, who confirmed that he had been a fighter in the Mai Mai Zabuloni and subsequently in the th brigade up untiland that he was the cousin of Colonel Nakabaka. The FARDC witnesses also testified to the T2 that there had been several diversions of military equipment in the three months prior to this specific incident, and that Yves Mukulikire was involved in at least two of them.
The T2 case file also describes the results of an internal investigation into the state of the tenth military regions stockpile conducted on 2 Februaryconcerning significant stocks of arms and ammunition that had either disappeared or were not being accounted for.
The results show that two boxes of 40 mm grenades, six boxes of The equipment was found in a house owned by Colonel Nakabaka in Uvira. In the week following the seizure of the arms, Programme for Peace, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation PARECa local non-governmental organization, claimed that it had been responsible for recovering the arms one by one over the period of 15 months as part of a cash-for-weapons programme supporting disarmament activities.
The Group does not consider this plausible, as 65 per cent of the AKs seized were from five separate production series, and all the Uzis belonged to two production series displaying consecutive production serial numbers. This pattern suggests the weapons are more likely to have been taken from a stockpile, rather than handed in individually by different fighters.
The Group corroborated this conclusion through credible testimonies that the arms cache seized on 16 June belonged to a stock of weapons under the control of the joint FNLFDLR-Mai Mai network responsible for the attack against the town of Uvira on 9 April On the night of 14 Julyacting again on the Groups information, the MONUC Pakistani military contingent seized another arms cache in a different house in Uvira, including eight mm rockets, two AK rifles, nineteen rounds of 7.
The Group has not been able to meet the officials of the Ministry of Defence in Kinshasa to discuss these cases. While working with MONUC on the above cases, the Group developed a model database for the identification of weapons seized by MONUC, including pictures of all the relevant markings necessary for subsequent tracing exercises.
The Group also established from analysing telephone records that in Colonel Nakabaka was in telephone communication with Major Fudjo Zabuloni, the commander of the Mai Mai Zabuloni in Uvira territory.
Both Fudjo and Mazuru have separately been in telephone contact with Bande Ndagundi, a Congolese citizen who is involved in arms trafficking and recruitment activities on behalf of non-State armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to evidence gathered by the Group see paras.
Ndagundis network in the United Republic of Tanzania. The FNL dissident elements participating in the 9 April attack were reportedly recruited in Burundi by Congolese nationals and given money and weapons.
This fact was established on the basis of testimonies received from 243e2009 military officials, FDLR former combatants and an FNL former combatant directly involved in the 9 April attack.
In addition, two Burundian nationals, arrested and interrogated by Congolese military justice officials sol an element of the Mai Mai Zabuloni, stated that they had been approached in Burundi by recruiters who were specifically looking for well-trained soldiers.
On the basis of consistent interviews collected throughout the mandate, the Group is of the view that the networks among FDLR, Mai Mai and FNL have formed an alliance in the face of solnn Kimia II operations and collaborate tightly with each other. As part of this alliance, the three armed groups cooperate in smuggling natural resources from the territory of Uvira to Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania, share weapons stocks and assist each other to infiltrate and hide out in the Ruzizi 234s2009 and across the border in forested areas in Burundi.
Colonel David Rugayi According to these testimonies, the equipment reportedly included hundreds of mm cannon rockets, a recoilless mm cannon, several rocket-propelled grenades, three machine guns of According to several military sources, Colonel Rugayis 14th brigade was also heavily infiltrated by FDLR fighters when it was deployed in mining-rich zones in the territory of Kalehe.
One of the FDLR former combatants informed the Group that he had been part of a group of 50 FDLR porters who were sent down from Kalehe to the town of Kalungu at the end ofwhere Colonel Rugayi transferred to them a number of AK assault rifles, machine guns and roughly a hundred mm rockets. The former combatant relayed that his commander had personally met Colonel 243s2090 in Kalungu, and that FARDC 243s009 arrived from Bukavu, the headquarters of the tenth military region, to deliver the equipment.